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Abstract
Amy Chua’s World on Fire is a stimulating book that links the 1990s spread of
democracy and market reforms with perceptions of increasing ethnic violence.
Chua points out that many developing countries have “market-dominant” minor-
ity groups that wield disproportionate economic power. In the presence of such
minorities, Chua argues, the simultaneous introduction of markets and democ-
racy can lead to ethnic violence. Market liberalization can exacerbate minority
control over the economy, while democratization provides incentives for dema-
gogues to target the minority group. While her model has explanatory power in
some contexts, the book pays insufﬁcient attention to social science techniques
and evidence. She deﬁnes her explanatory variables, democracy and markets, too
broadly to facilitate a test of her theory. In discussing incidents of ethnic violence
and tension, her approach to evidence is anecdotal, and she does not consider
the number and intensity of cases where democratization and markets may have
reduced ethnic tension. Recent studies suggest that the number and intensity of
ethnic conﬂicts are in decline around the world, an important ﬁnding that should
lead to caution in hastily adopting policies based on Chua’s analysis. Both de-
mocratization and a reduction in ethnic tension, it is argued, can be facilitated by
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 Amy Chua's World on Fire is a stimulating book that links the 1990s spread of 
democracy and market reforms with perceptions of increasing ethnic violence.  Chua 
points out that many developing countries have "market-dominant" minority groups that 
wield disproportionate economic power. In the presence of such minorities, Chua 
argues, the simultaneous introduction of markets and democracy can lead to ethnic 
violence.  Market liberalization can exacerbate minority control over the economy, while 
democratization provides incentives for demagogues to target the minority group.  While 
her model has explanatory power in some contexts, the book pays insufficient attention to 
social science techniques and evidence.  She defines her explanatory variables, 
democracy and markets, too broadly to facilitate a test of her theory.  In discussing 
incidents of ethnic violence and tension, her approach to evidence is anecdotal, and she 
does not consider the number and intensity of cases where democratization and markets 
may have reduced ethnic tension. Recent studies suggest that the number and intensity of 
ethnic conflicts are in decline around the world, an important finding that should lead to 
caution in hastily adopting policies based on Chua's analysis. Both democratization and a 
reduction in ethnic tension, it is argued, can be facilitated by the international community. 
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  The field of law and development studies has come up with few big ideas.  Borne 
out of 1960s optimism about the possibilities of law influencing social change, the early 
law and development movement sought to export American ideas, institutions, and 
educational methods to developing societies.  But law and development soon turned 
inward in frustration at the slow pace of change and the resistance of elites in the 
developing world.
   Perhaps the most cited article demonstrating the dissatisfaction and 
disappointment in the field is a piece of self-flagellation, by Trubek and Galanter, which 
examines a litany of failed assumptions and unmet promise.
1 
                                                 
∗ Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign.  Thanks to 
Linda Beale, Ravi Bhavnani, Clifford Clark, Kevin Davis, Rajmohan Gandhi, Patrick Keenan, Richard 
McAdams, Daria Roithmayr, Jeffrey A. Wolf, and Michael Vogel for helpful comments. Thanks to Maury 
Saiger and Jeffrey A. Wolf for research assistance. 
1 David Trubek & Mark Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law 
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1975).  This article may have set 
the stage for the critical legal studies movement.  See Richard Bilder & Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law and 
Development, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 470, 473 (1995) (reviewing LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (Anthony Carty, ed., 
1992) and LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy Adelman and Abdul Paliwala eds., 1993).  
Critique remains the favored mode of law and society scholars who work in this area.  See generally Carol   3
Yet the effort to export American institutions did not end with the demise of the 
first law and development movement.  Reflecting shifts in Washington’s policy, the late 
1970s saw a focus primarily on human rights institutions, and the 1980s saw a move 
toward police training. In the 1990s, in the aftermath of the Cold War, a massive new 
wave of law-exporting activities began, promoted by foundations, global economic 
institutions, and nongovernmental actors, along with the development agencies of the 
United States and many other countries.  Much of this activity reflected a new consensus 
on how rich countries should deal with poor ones, with law playing a central role.  The 
“Washington Consensus” as it became known, held that exporting democratic 
governance, economic liberalization and the rule of law would lead to a better world.  
Like the earlier “law and development” movement, it assumed that institutions could 
transfer and that legal reform held the key to economic growth.  In contrast with the 
earlier efforts, however, it has maintained momentum for some time and appears to be in 
no danger of letting up.
2   
  Against this backdrop, Professor Amy Chua has expounded what is potentially a 
new “big idea” in the arena of law and development.
3 Chua observes that the spread of 
democracy and markets in the 1990s was accompanied by a surge in ethnic instability and 
violence.  The most visible cases were the breakup of Yugoslavia, leading to genocides in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rose, The "New" Law and Development Movement in the Post- Cold War Era: A Vietnam Case Study, 32 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 93 (1998); Bryant Garth, Law and Society as Law and Development, 37 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV.  301 (2003); Bryant G. Garth,  Building Strong And Independent Judiciaries Through the New Law 
and Development: Behind the Paradox of  Consensus Programs and Perpetually Disappointing Results, 52 
DEPAUL L. REV. 383 (2002); see also JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM (1979). 
2  See, e.g., Center on International Cooperation, Reconstruction of Afghanistan, at 
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/conflict/conflict_translations.html [last visited Dec. 22, 2003]; United States 
Institute for Peace, Establishing Justice and the Rule of Law in Iraq: A Blueprint for Action, at 
http://www.usip.org/events/2003/0801_ESIraq_law.html [last visited Dec. 22, 2003]. 
3 AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED 
AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003).   4
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and the mid-decade Rwanda genocide.  In many other 
locales too, Chua notes that ethnic tensions are on the rise.  Instead of seeing genocide 
and ethnic tension as mere aberrations on the modernist road to peace and prosperity, 
Chua connects the phenomenon to the Washington consensus and its failure to consider 
racial and ethnic factors.
4  
In particular, she calls attention to the phenomenon of market-dominant 
minorities, ethnic groups that enjoy disproportionate success in entrepreneurship and 
capital accumulation.  From the Chinese in Indonesia, who constitute 3% of the 
population but control 70% of non-land assets; to Jewish oligarchs in post-Soviet Russia, 
who are six of the seven richest men in the country; to Lebanese in Sierra Leone; to the 
Ibo in Nigeria, certain groups of ethnic minorities often do disproportionally well in 
economic terms.  Given this general phenomenon, democracy and economic 
liberalization may exacerbate ethnic tension.  Ethnic minorities with market skills, says 
Chua, are well positioned to benefit from free market reforms, while democratization and 
political liberalization make it easier for poorer majorities to express resentment against 
these groups. The result is ethnic demagoguery as political entrepreneurs compete for 
support by highlighting the gap in wealth between market dominant minorities and poorer 
majorities.  Globalization, she notes, has exacerbated the phenomenon: “democracy, 
rather than reinforcing the market’s efficiency and wealth producing effects, leads to 
powerful ethnonationalist, anti-market pressures and routinely results in confiscation, 
instability, authoritarian backlash, and violence.”
5 
                                                 
4 CHUA, supra note 3. 
5  Id. at 16. 
   5
  Chua’s powerful connections between democracy, development and ethnicity 
synthesize a massive amount of information into an elegant argument of global scale. It is  
in many ways a lawyer’s argument, accumulating vast evidence to build an apparently 
unimpeachable case. It also has the advantage of simplicity, which means it is likely to 
sell in Washington, D.C.  But is Chua correct?  The answer to this question requires 
careful consideration of the evidence, which in turn requires the use of the techniques of 
social science.  This essay suggests that, when examined more closely, the connections 
Chua draws are not supported by the evidence. While her account, inspired by the 
experience of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, fits certain contexts, she extends the 
argument further than the data warrants.  Ultimately, there is less reason to be pessimistic 
than Chua suggests, despite the continuing presence of ethnic violence. 
  Part II of this review lays out Chua’s argument about democracy, markets and 
ethnicity.  Part III evaluates whether her positive argument is consistent with what social 
scientists have learned about these questions, and shows that her argument is incomplete 
in important ways.  Part IV focuses on Chua’s normative conclusions.  Even if Chua’s 
positive analysis were accurate, her normative conclusions are wanting, and fail to 
account for the extensive role that international actors can play in reducing the threat of 




Chua’s book focuses on the phenomenon of market dominant minorities that 
perform disproportionately well in economic activity.  Market dominant minorities, Chua   6
points out, exist in many societies.  Perhaps the paradigm case is the Chinese in Southeast 
Asia, whose minority status and economic success have been treated as a problem in 
every nation in the region over the last century, with very different policy responses.
6  
Jews, Indians, Lebanese, and many other groups play similar roles in other societies. 
Market dominant minorities often form networks that provide advantages in trading and 
other economically valuableactivities.
7  Their advantages of in-group trust, developed 
through repeated transactions and the availability of reputational sanctions, along with 
transnational networks, reduce their transaction costs of exchange.
8  This can lead to 
phenomenal economic success in a variety of environments. 
  Market dominant minorities tend to be economically successful but politically 
weak, either because of their small numbers, immigrant status, or lack of access to the 
technology of coercion represented by the state.  Political weakness makes them ideal 
coalition partners for autocratic rulers who can provide protection in exchange for 
economic support. Political marginalization may in turn exacerbate the problem of 
economic inequality, as young talented minorities invest resources in becoming better 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., ANTHONY REID & DANIEL CHIROT, ESSENTIAL OUTSIDERS (1997); SOJOURNERS AND SETTLERS: 
HISTORIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE CHINESE (Anthony Reid ed., 1996); UNGROUNDED EMPIRES: THE 
CULTURAL POLITICS OF MODERN CHINESE TRANSNATIONALISM (Aihwa Ong & Donald Nonini, eds., 1997); 
SOUTHEAST ASIAN CHINESE AND CHINA (Leo Suryadinata ed., 1995); Stephen A. Douglas, Political 
Dynamics of the Diaspora: the Chinese in Southeast Asia, 5 ASIAN J. POL. SCI. 37 (1997); See also, Farid 
Harianto, Business Linkages and Chinese Entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia, in CULTURE & ECONOMY: THE 
SHAPING OF CAPITALISM IN EASTERN ASIA (Timothy Brook & Hy V. Luong eds., 1997); Pek Koon Heng, 
Robert Kuok and the Chinese Business Network in Eastern Asia: a Study in Sino-capitalism, in CULTURE & 
ECONOMY: THE SHAPING OF CAPITALISM IN EASTERN ASIA (Timothy Brook & Hy V. Luong eds., 1997); 
THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Linda Y.C. Lim and Peter Gosling eds., 1983). 
7 See JANET TAI LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
OF ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT-EXCHANGE (1994). 
8 For an analysis of the factors that might account for market-dominant minorities, see Kevin Davis, 
Michael Trebilcock & Bradley Heys, Ethnically Homogenous Elites in Developing Countries, 32 L. & 
POL’Y IN INT’L BUSINESS 331 (2001).   7
businessmen rather than bureaucrats, politicians or soldiers.  Meanwhile, opportunities 
for members of the majority who lack market skills are more constrained, and may lead 
them to join the military or state apparatus. 
  The 1990s shift toward political and economic liberalization, Chua argues, 
exacerbated the tensions between market dominant minorities and relatively poorer 
majorities. The argument is simple.  Liberalization provides even greater advantages to 
those who already have market skills, the politically disfavored minority which can then 
become even richer relative to the poorer majority.  Democratization creates political 
competition for the votes of the majority—providing opportunities for demagogues to 
exploit resentment against the market dominant minority.  The result is backlash.   
Chua identifies three forms of backlash.  First, there can be a backlash against 
economic liberalization, as voters elect anti-market populists who favor redistribution.  
Second, there can be a backlash against democracy, as members of the economically 
dominant minority form coalitions with autocrats and limit majority participation.  Third, 
and most troubling, there can be backlash against the minorities themselves, in the form 
of ethnic violence and racial targeting.   
  Chua illustrates the backlash against economic liberalization with the case of 
Zimbabwe, where populist demagogue Robert Mugabe has in recent years increased his 
anti-white rhetoric and encouraged confiscations by non-governmental invaders.  Another 
example is the phenomenon of Hugo Chavez, the former paratrooper who has targeted 
the assets of Venezuela’s oil elites and large landowners.  As Chua notes, nationalizations   8
have occurred in many countries, and often target ethnic minorities who are politically 
weak.
9   
  The backlash against democracy is illustrated by Sierra Leone, where an ethnic 
minority, the Lebanese, had long dominated the country’s economy.  In the early 1970s, 
Siaka Stevens declared a state of emergency and promoted the business interests of a 
small handful of Lebanese cronies, who controlled the country’s lucrative diamond trade.  
This alliance allowed Stevens to finance his patronage network while protecting the 
Lebanese from threat.  The backlash against democracy is also well illustrated with 
Suharto’s Indonesia, where Suharto protected the Chinese minority from the worst 
excesses of violent social movements, while relying on Chinese capital to fund pet 
projects and set up his own family in business.  Autocracy and crony capitalism go hand-
in-hand, and often have an ethnic underpinning, according to Chua. 
  The third backlash, against the minorities themselves, is illustrated by Serbia and 
Rwanda.  Typically the process involves anti-minority demagoguery, whose proponents 
want not only the wealth of the minorities but the ethnic cleansing of the country.  For 
example, in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russians were expelled 
from the various non-Russian republics.  More prominently, the authors of the Rwanda  
genocide exhorted their followers to cleanse the country of Tutsi “cockroaches.”
10   
                                                 
9 CHUA, supra note 3, at 130-31. Chua could also have highlighted how foreign investors, also frequently 
targeted by populist anti-market politicians, enjoy far greater protection than local market-dominant 
minorities because of international standards that require full compensation for expropriated property.  See, 
e.g., The Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, art. 13, 34 I.L.M. 360 (1995) (requiring compensation at 
fair market value);
 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1110, cl. 2, 32 I.L.M. 605, 
641 (1993). See also Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? Nafta's Investment 
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78 NYU L. REV. 
30, 32-41 (2003). 
10 Amended Indictment of Jean-Bosco Barayangwiza, ¶¶5.10-5.13 (ICTR 97-19) (Apr. 13, 2000); 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiz, 2000 WL 33951198 (citing radio broadcasts describing Tutsis as 
inyenzi or cockroaches.); See also, BILL BERKELEY, THE GRAVES ARE NOT YET FULL: RACE, TRIBE AND   9
As these examples show, the various forms of backlash can be overlapping.  
When Mugabe targets white farms, he  instigates a backlash not only against economic 
openness but also against white farmers. Attempts to banish the ethnic Russian 
population from, say, Lithuania, may be simultaneously anti-Russian and anti-
democratic.  Furthermore, these backlashes are typically ineffective in achieving their 
goals.  The minorities who suffer from backlash are typically from the lower and middle 
classes, not members of the upper class.  And rather than empowering and enriching poor 
majorities, backlash tends to undermine the economy and democracy at the same time.   
  One of Chua’s great strengths is her ability to explain an amazing amount of 
disparate phenomena with this simple dynamic.  This book is global in scope, and 
challenges much conventional wisdom.  For example, Latin America is often thought of 
as a region without ethnicity in the sense that it exists in Europe or Asia.  But in many 
countries in Latin America, a light skinned elite of European descendant dominates a 
poorer majority of Native or Amerindian descent.  Chua points out that charismatic 
demagogues are increasingly exploiting Indian identity to clam political power, a 
phenomenon that she ties to economic globalization.  We thus see the phenomena of 
Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Alejandro Toledo in Peru, the nascent black consciousness 
movement of Brazil, and a rising Indian movement in Ecuador. 
  In another innovative argument, Chua claims that one of the causes of the Middle 
East conflict may be relative economic underperformance.  Israel’s relative success in a 
region of economic underperformance, she asserts, may render Israel to the Arab world 
                                                                                                                                                 
POWER IN THE HEART OF AFRICA 2 (2001); PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT 
TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1999).   10
what the Chinese are in the Philippines: an aloof, wealthy class that is viewed as failing 
to participate in the community and thus engenders backlash.   
Finally, Chua extends her analysis to incorporate the new global ideology of anti-
Americanism into the framework.  In a global sense, America, though ethnically diverse 
and open in identity, is a market-dominant minority.  America is to the world as minority 
ethnic elites  are to poor majorities in many countires: a small, conspicuously wealthy 
minority, believed to pay insufficient attention to the poor majority and structuring the 
rules of the game for our own self-interest.  The result: backlash against markets, 
democracy and Americans, who continue to be the leading target of terrorist violence 
around the world.




Chua’s approach to evidence is anecdotal.  Rather than use social science 
methodologies, she accumulates individual examples of ethnic conflict from virtually 
every region of the globe to support her thesis.  This section develops two related 
critiques. First, Chua defines key terms so broadly as to make virtually any instance of 
ethnic conflict fit her paradigm.  Second, her argument depends on a causal claim that she 
does not adequately establish.  Once we examine the social science research, the story 
appears, as one might guess, much more complicated. For a book that seeks to be a policy 
critique, these are profound weaknesses. 
A. Definitions   11
Chua does not adequately define her key terms.  She adopts a pragmatic approach,  
defining markets and democratization as the kind of economic and political reforms 
“actually being implemented today outside the West.”
12  This pragmatism ought to lead to 
caution with regard to both the positive analysis and normative conclusions.
13  
Democracy and market reforms are not uniform phenomena.  Not every instance of a 
democratizing reform should be condemned simply because some such reforms, in some 
places, have led some politicians to engage in ethnic demagoguery.  Similarly, the 
particular institutional design and structure of markets may make all the difference.  Most 
economists think markets are generally beneficial, but few these days would contest the 
assertion that institutional structures vary in important ways in different markets, and that 
this has serious consequences for both growth and distribution, which in turn are likely to 
effect the probability of ethnic tension.   
Without crisp definitions of Chua’s key terms, it is difficult to assess whether 
Chua is indeed correct. Chua can and does use the “wiggle room” in her definitions to 
include a wide array of phenomena that may or may not fit, making her causal claim 
appear more plausible. We take each of her key terms in turn. 
 
1. Democracy 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/ [last checked Dec. 22, 2003]. 
12 CHUA, supra note 3, at 14 (emphasis in original). It is worth noting that the most visible genocides of the 
1990s, in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, were not preceded by major democracy programs supported by 
foreigners. 
13 Chua’s primary purpose is positive, not normative. However, she does not altogether avoid advancing 
normative recommendations.   12
Democracy in particular is a complicated phenomenon capable of multiple 
definitions and conceptions.  Some view democracy as procedural in essence, involving 
free and fair elections that determine who is to govern, and no more.
14  Others view 
democracy as institutional, involving a set of particular structures with particular 
functions, such as a parliament, courts, and a free media; this view is implicitly assumed 
by many development agencies.
15  Theorists tend to favor a more substantive conception 
of democracy that incorporates specific rights or focuses on substantive levels of 
participation by the citizenry, regardless of formal structures.
16   
Chua’s normative suggestion, developed briefly in the end of the book, that 
constitutionalism is a partial palliative, reveals her assumption that democracy is 
electoral; that is rule by majority.
17  This narrow characterization has been challenged on 
normative grounds by theorists and by empirical scholars who have pointed out the 
potential for illiberal outcomes that it raises.
18  More importantly for her normative claim, 
very few policymakers involved in “promoting democracy” abroad rely on such a thin 
conception of democracy, and most efforts to export democracy involve an extensive set 
of institutional reforms, including an open media, civil society, and constitutionalism.  
                                                 
14 This view is associated with JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).  
See also, Brad Roth, Evaluating Democratic Governance, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory Fox and Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Molly Beutz, Functional Democracy: 
Responding to Failures of Accountability, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 387, 396-401 (2003) (discussing differing 
conceptions of democracy.) 
15 THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABOARD: THE LEARNING CURVE (1999). 
16 See Roth, supra note 14. 
17 CHUA, supra note 3, at 14 (democratization is “immediate elections with universal suffrage.”) 
18 See, e.g., FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM (2003); GUILLERMO O’DONNELL, THE UNRULE OF 
LAW (1999); Samuel Huntington, After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave, 8 J. DEMOCRACY 3, 
10 (1997); Larry Diamond, Is the Third Wave Over? 7 J. DEMOCRACY 20 (1997).   13
Independent courts are considered to be an essential to democracy programs because of 
their role in protecting minority rights.
19  Mere electoral democracy is increasingly a 
straw man, not a faithful representative of democratization “actually being implemented 
today outside the West.”  It is noteworthy that Chua does not identify strong connections 
between actual programs to promote democracy by foreign actors and the ethnic violence 
on which she focuses. 
In any case, by failing to explicitly choose a definition of democracy, Chua has the 
advantage of being able to attribute many things to democracy that may have little to do 
with it.  Her analysis of the Rwanda conflict is perhaps the most obvious example of this 
tendency.  As the largest scale genocide of the 1990s, Rwanda would seem to be a central 
case for her thesis to explain.  Few would consider Rwanda circa 1993 a democracy:  
although an internationally brokered power-sharing agreement calling for democracy had 
been proposed in Arusha in 1993, incitement by the ethnic Hutu government had begun 
several years earlier.
20  Chua acknowledges the difficulties: many people, she notes, 
“insist that the horrors of Rwanda had nothing to do with democracy…But the fact 
remains that a majority of the Rwandan people supported, indeed personally conducted, 
the unspeakable atrocities committed in 1994.”
21  The fact that a majority of a population 
commits an atrocity, or is complicit with it, hardly renders that action a result of 
                                                 
19 CAROTHERS, supra note 15, at 163-79. 
20 See Indictment of Jean-Bosco Barayangwiza, supra note 10, at ¶¶1.5, 1.14 (ICTR 97-19) (13 April 
2000). 
21 CHUA, supra note 3, at 170.   14
democracy.
22   By defining democracy as anything supported by a majority, Chua renders 
her argument tautological.  Any violence perpetrated by a majority against a minority 
becomes in some sense “democratically” sanctioned.  Adolf Hitler—who after all, 
assumed power through democratic channels—becomes a democratic leader. With this 
definition, we should not then be surprised when “democracy” appears to cause ethnic 
violence against minorities. 
Similarly, to say that Robert Mugabe’s regime and its targeting of property of the 
market-dominant white majority is “democratic” seems a reach.
23   While in some sense 
the return of Zimbabwe to its indigenous majority in 1979 was a democratic moment, 
Mugabe has always been a demagogue.  His troops killed between 6,000 and 20,000 
civilians in Matabeland in 1983, long before the current round of anti-white rhetoric and 
confiscations.
24  As time went on, Mugabe consolidated power, forcing constitutional 
reforms and eliminating rivals.  Partially in response to growing international pressure 
leading up to elections in 2002, Mugabe resorted to further demagoguery and began his 
targeting of white farms, but this does not mean that the elections or international 
pressure were causal.  Mugabe’s electoral fraud in 2002 was widely reported, and it is 
likely that a free and fair democratic election would have produced a different result.
25 
                                                 
22 See, On a Patch of Grass, ECONOMIST, May 18, 2003 (describing Rwanda’s gacaca process); DANIEL 
JONAH GOLDHAGEN: HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS (1996). 
23 CHUA, supra note 3, at 11. 
24 Norma J. Kriger, Robert Mugabe, Another Too-Long-Serving African Ruler: A Review Essay, 118 POL. 
SCI. Q. 307, 308 (2003). 
25 Chua notes that the election fraud was not more extensive than other elections the West has certified as 
free and fair.  But that hardly means the election was free and fair.   15
Zimbabwe is a place where democracy is clearly part of the solution, not part of the 
problem.  
In short, there are problems with Chua’s characterization of democracy.  Her 
pragmatic definition is so broad as to include virtually any majoritarian phenomenon.  
Since any violence perpetrated by a majority against a market-dominant minority is by 
definition majoritarian, it is hardly surprising that she finds a link between democracy 
and ethnic violence. The risk is that policymakers, buoyed by her exhortation to 
“understand” ethnic dynamics, will refrain from the sustained international engagement 
that may be necessary for democratic institutions to thrive.   
 
2. Markets 
Similarly, “markets” is a broad phenomenon.  Here Chua focuses on the neo-
liberal model of privatization and free-market capitalism that is increasingly coming 
under scrutiny in the development community.
26   In her analysis of specific cases, 
however, Chua moves away from the neo-liberal view to include such disparate market 
phenomena as Suharto’s crony capitalism, the Russian klepto-privatization of the mid-
1990s, and Israel’s economy as a whole. But the extent to which these societies have 
liberalized varies. The Russian privatization fits her paradigm well, and was undertaken 
under the guidance of the IMF and economists such as Jeffrey Sachs. But few economists 
would describe Suharto’s Indonesia as a free market system.  Similarly, for much of its 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002).   16
history, Israel was a socialist state, and even today has very limited private ownership of 
land.  This hardly follows IMF dictates.
27   
Chua also asserts that the government of Myanmar is “aggressively pro-
market.”
28 While the SLORC government may have abandoned Ne Win’s “Burmese road 
to socialism,” (a program that had impoverished what had been considered one of the 
most promising economies in the developing world), the utter corruption of today’s 
Myanmar regime bears slight resemblance to what a free market would look like.  Here, 
Chua’s pragmatic (i.e. loose) definition saves her.  Relative to pre-1988 Burma, Myanmar 
has indeed become more marketized.  That it bears little resemblance to an idealized free 
market, and looks much more like a narco-military regime, is not Chua’s problem.  But it 
does implicate her normative conclusions: it is at least plausible that the solution for such 
countries is not less marketization but more. It is arguable that liberalization will 
decrease the returns of crony capitalists.  By allowing in new market participants, 
including foreign investors, liberalization might actually level the domestic playing 
field.
29  The point is that an economist would hardly lump all these phenomena together.  
If “markets” can be used to describe any economic policy pursued outside of Cuba or 
North Korea, then it is not surprising to find a link between markets and any political or 
                                                 
27 Israel’s early 1990s shift toward economic liberalization did not result in any appreciable increase in 
Arab anti-Israeli sentiment, which has been a sad fact of life for the entire history of the state and has, as 
Chua acknowledges, multiple and complex causes. CHUA, supra note 3, at 212.  See also, NORMAN 
STILLMAN, THE JEWS OF ARAB LANDS (1979); BENNY MORRIS, RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS: A HISTORY OF THE 
ZIONIST-ARAB CONFLICT 1881-1998 (1999). 
28 CHUA, supra note 3, at 24. 
29 See Quan Li and Adam Resnick, Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct 
Investment Inflows to Developing Countries, 57 INT'L ORG. 175 (2003)   17
social outcome in the last twenty years including ethnic tension.  But correlation and 
causation are different.   
There are strong empirical and theoretical reasons to think that the precise manner 
of liberalization is of greater consequence than the fact of liberalization, which Chua 
finds to be nearly universal.  A short-term big bang program, as was implemented in 
post-1991 Russia, seems likely to produce rising unemployment and inequality, as well as 
the minority dominance that Chua identifies.  The big bang was far more socially 
disruptive than a gradualist reform program such as has been undertaken in China the last 
two decades.
30  But her broad definition of markets treats both approaches as identical, 
though the details of these policy choices are likely to be what matter. 
The Malaysian case illustrates the variety of different type of market institutions 
and the way that, under certain circumstances, economic liberalization can reduce ethnic 
tension.  In Malaysia, ethnic identity is an explicit basis of politics, but the state has 
channeled formerly violent political conflict into peaceful channels, in part through 
majoritarian affirmative action programs in the form of the New Economic Policy. 
Malaysia has done this while maintaining a relatively liberal economic environment, 
open to foreign investment and at least as “market-oriented” as Burma’s.  The rising 
wealth and careful management of ethnic factors in a society that suffered massive 
violence only a generation ago shows that economic development can proceed while 
                                                 
30 Chua notes that China has liberalized politically at the same time it has introduced market reforms.  See 
CHUA, supra note 3, 175.  Because China has no market-dominant minority, it does not implicate Chua’s 
argument.   18
ethnic violence is reduced.
31  And Malaysia has done so while remaining a semi-
democracy, retaining electoral institutions.
32   
 
3. Ethnicity 
Ethnicity, too is a complicated and multi-faceted phenomenon. Chua recognizes 
that ethnicity is both socially constructed (hence malleable) and perceived as real (hence 
relatively intractable).  Societies that appear to us to be homogenous could, given 
alternative historical trajectories, have become ethnicized rather easily.  It is also 
important to remember that in much of the world, colonialism created and  exacerbated 
ethnic tensions where none had existed.  The Hutu-Tutsi conflict, for example, arose with 
Belgian colonial racializing, rigidifying groups that were previously fluid.
33 
When Chua turns to the specific phenomenon of ethnic violence, however, she 
offers no definition.  Ethnic tension and ethnic violence are different things.
34  Chua often 
seems to be focusing on ethnic tension or grievance, but at other times shifts her focus to 
actual violence.  Not every instance of ethnic tension leads to  ethnic violence, defined 
as"violence perpetrated across ethnic lines, in which at least one party is not a state (or 
                                                 
31Deepa Khosla, Chinese in Malaysia: Balancing Inequalities, in PEOPLES VERSUS STATES 133 (Ted Robert 
Gurr ed., 2000); Malaysia is also noteworthy for resisting the IMF’s suggested approach during the Asian 
Economic crisis of 1997-98.  Whereas the IMF recommended austerity programs that tended to hurt the 
lower class, Malaysia implemented a program of capital controls that insulated it from the painful 
recessions experienced by other countries in the region.  STIGLITZ, supra note 26, at 122-25.  Chua 
discounts the transferability of the Malaysian model.  See, CHUA supra note 3, at 272. 
32 While there is plenty to criticize in Mahathir Mohamad’s long rule, Malaysia would certainly pass 
Chua’s definition of democracy if Rwanda in 1993 did.  Compare text at note 18, supra. 
33CHUA supra note 3, at 15.  See Bowen, The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict, 7 J. DEMOC. 3, 4 (1996); 
Yash Ghai, Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis, in AUTONOMY AND ETHNICITY: 
NEGOTIATING COMPETING CLAIMS IN MULTI-ETHNIC STATES (Yash Ghai ed., 2000). 
34 R. M. Williams, The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: Comparative International Perspectives, 20 ANN. 
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representative of a state), and in which the putative ethnic difference is integral rather 
than incidental to that violence.”
35  Since the degree of “ethnic” contribution to the 
violence is hardly self-defining, “ethnic” violence is not intrinsic to the act but a matter of 
later characterization.
36  One must therefore use caution in characterizing the motive to 
violence as ethnic.  Even within the category of violence, there are vast qualitative 
differences between mass genocides such as those in Rwanda, other more common 
phenomena of episodic deadly ethnic riots, and violent protests. These are but three of the 
myriad forms ethnic violence can take.
37  We ought to “identify, analyze and explain the 
heterogeneous processes and mechanisms involved in generating the varied instances of 




  As with democracy and markets, Chua does not adequately define her terms in a 
way that allows precise empirical evaluation.  An example is her treatment of Thailand.  
Like other countries in Southeast Asia, overseas Chinese form a market-dominant 
minority.  Unlike other countries in the region, the ethnic distinction between Thai and 
Chinese is not emphasized and indeed suppressed.  Chua points out, accurately, that this 
reflects coercion by the pre-democratic Thai state earlier in the twentieth century, as if 
this supports her argument.  I would have thought the more central fact about Thailand is 
                                                 
35 Rogers Brubaker & David D. Laitin, Ethnic and Nationalist Violence, 24 ANNUAL REV. SOCIOL. 423, 
428 (1998).   
36 Id., at 445. 
37 DONALD HOROWITZ, THE DEADLY ETHNIC RIOT 1, 19 (2001).   20
the simultaneous introduction of democracy and economic reform since the adoption of a 
new constitution in 1997.
39  This has been accompanied by the emergence of a new Thai 
identity that emphasizes not ethnic origin but citizenship and service to the Thai nation, 
effectively reducing the barrier between Sino-Thai and Thai to zero.
40  If Chua were 
correct, we should have seen a backlash of some kind, yet none has emerged.  Markets 
and democracy facilitated ethnic integration, whereas autocracy in previous periods 
exacerbated it. 
  Another definitional lacuna is “market dominant minority.”  The position of 
immigrant groups such as Chinese in Southeast Asia and Lebanese in Sierra Leone may 
not be analogous to colonial remnants such as whites in Zimbabwe.  The immigrant 
groups are certainly not analogous to many of the groups in Africa that she identifies as 
market dominant minorities.  The Ebe in Togo and Bamileke in Cameroon came by their 
“dominance” through geography, because they inhabit areas near trade routes.
41  The 
Kikuyu in Kenya may perform well economically, but are a plurality of the population 
and hence less likely to be the target of backlash than the Chinese in Indonesia, for 
instance.   The particular historical reasons behind market dominance may include 
geography, colonialism, and many other factors of critical importance that ought to make 
a difference for outcomes.   
                                                                                                                                                 
38 Brubaker and Laitin, supra note35, at 447.  See also John R. Bowen, supra note 33, at 3 (ethnic conflict 
has “become a shorthand way to speak about any and all violent confrontations between groups of people 
living in the same country.”) 
39 Pinai Nanakorn, Re-making of the Constitution in Thailand, 6 SING. J. INT’L COMP. L. 90 (2002). 
40 William A. Callahan, Beyond Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism, Diasporic Chinese and Neo-
Nationalism in China and Thailand, 57 INT’L ORG. 481 (2003). 
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Despite these definitional lapses, Chua’s framework does provide food for 
thought, especially when extending beyond market dominant minorities.  For example, 
global anti-Americanism may in fact contain a component of economic resentment, 
though the more visible and obvious sources are directed against specific policies and 
framed as such.  But whereas most market dominant minorities are politically weak, 
America is hegemonic.  This means the predicted backlash is not likely to be against 
markets, but a “backlash against democracy” at the global level.  American resistance to 
international institutions that reflect the will of the majority of states, such as the UN 
General Assembly and more recently the International Criminal Court, illustrate the 
reluctance of a market-dominant minority to be governed by rules established by a 
majority of the “community of nations.”  Furthermore, American hypocrisy on issues of 
free trade—utilizing free market rhetoric while we retain tariffs for politically important 
sectors such as agriculture and steel—does little to advance our image abroad and fosters 
a backlash against both markets and democracy.   
The Middle East story is more complicated, as Chua acknowledges, and may not 
fit the paradigm as easily.  The origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict are intensely contested 
but few have argued that relative wealth is a primary cause.  Indeed, anti-Israel sentiment 
seems to be greater in wealthy countries like Saudi Arabia than in the poor countries of 
Egypt and Jordan. However, relative wealth may be a factor: part of the intensity 
surrounding the conflict lies in stark images of the squalor of Palestinian life existing 
within a few miles of a first-world economy. On the other hand, it is also a bit odd to 
characterize Israel as a regional market-dominant minority when most of its neighbors 
refuse to trade with it and thus do not participate in the same market. Nevertheless, one   22
wonders if Arab economies would be in the same poor state they are in today had they 
not discriminated against, expropriated, and in some cases expelled, their Jewish 
minorities, an underappreciated part of the story surrounding the establishment of 
Israel.
42   
In short, Chua’s use of anecdotal evidence provides a powerful argument of 
global scope integrating many diverse phenomena.   It is a stimulating line of reasoning, 
and my sense is that it fits some Southeast Asian contexts well (though not others as my 
discussion of Thailand indicated.)  However, to establish causality, more careful 
definitions are needed.  There are strong theoretical reasons to think that democracy and 
markets, properly defined and realized, can reduce ethnic conflict: democracy can 
channel conflict from the bullet to the ballot box, while markets can remove unfair 
advantages of crony capitalism.  If causal linkages are to be established, an anecdotal 
approach to evidence cannot be dispositive.  To untangle whether Chua’s theories 
describing the relationship among markets, democracy, and ethnic violence have greater 
explanatory power, a more social scientific approach is needed. 
 
B.  Causality: What Does the Data Say? 
Chua’s suggestion is that democracy + markets = ethnic hatred. This equation 
implies causality.  Although in a number of places, Chua seems to qualify this thesis to 
make the weaker claim that free market democracy merely contributes to ethnic tension, 
the causal claim is announced on the book’s cover in the subtitle: “free market democracy 
breeds ethnic hatred and global instability.” Elsewhere, Chua states that markets and 
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democracy are a “principal, aggravating cause of group hatred and ethnic violence.”
43 
The policy recommendations also suggest a fairly strong causal claim. If the mix of 
democratization and market reform does not play a major role in producing ethnic 
violence, there is not much reason to read the book.   
The literature on the frequency and causes of ethnic violence and ethnic conflict is 
vast and engages Chua’s argument at many points.  This section focuses on two 
questions: is the resurgence of ethnic violence real?  And if so, what role, if any, do 
democracy and economic liberalization play in causing it? 
 
  1. More Ethnic Conflict? 
The first empirical issue is whether the perceived increase in ethnic violence in 
the 1990s is in fact a real resurgence, or whether it is a misperception based on a small 
number of high-profile events exacerbated by the growing power of the media. As 
Brubaker and Laitin point out, much literature characterizes the world as “a seething 
cauldron on the verge of boiling over or as a tinderbox, which a single careless spark 
could ignite into an inferno or ethnonationalist violence.”
44  But in fact, “actual instances 
of ethnic and nationalist violence remain rare.”
45  Ordinary symbolic and organizational 
politics, not violence, are the most common form of ethnic political action.
46   
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45 Brubaker & Laitin, supra note 35, at 424. 
46 TED ROBERT GURR, PEOPLES VERSUS STATES, 27 (2000); David Lake & Donald Rothchild, Spreading 
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It is also clear that ethnic violence is not unique to the 1990s, but has been 
steadily increasing since the 1950s.
47 One need only recall the mass murders of the 
1970s—by the Pakistani military in Bangladesh, by Idi Amin in Uganda, the Indonesian 
army in East Timor, and by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia,
48 to take only a few 
prominent examples—to realize that ethnic and political mass murder are hardly unique 
to an era of exporting markets and democracy. 
One of the analytic problems in determining whether there has in fact been an 
increase in ethnic violence is that violence is hardly self-defining.  People kill, rape and 
loot; later, other people, far removed, look at these acts and attribute a motivation in order 
to understand the violence.  We know that violence indeed surged in the early 1990s, but 
this may have been in part because conflicts over resources that had previously been 
thought of in Cold-War terms were now labeled “ethnic” by their perpetrators or by 
outside analysts.
49 
Ted Gurr, a leading scholar of ethnic conflict, has developed a dataset that tracks 
ethnic conflict over time.
50 He has tracked an increasing number of conflicts since the 
1970s.  Early in the 1990s, Gurr noted that there was an increase in ethnic conflict 
                                                                                                                                                 
1, 7 (David Lake & Donald Rothchild eds., 1998)(noting that most groups pursue interests peacefully); 
BERKELEY, supra note 10, at 35 (explaining that ethnic conflict is rare in Africa). 
47 Gurr, supra note 45, at 3. 
48 The ethnic component of the Khmer Rouge’s autogenocide is emphasized in BEN KIERNAN, THE POL 
POT REGIME: RACE, POWER AND GENOCIDE UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-79 (2002). 
49 Brubaker & Laitin, supra note 34; see also Saul Newman, Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political 
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of ethnic political conflict in both industrialized and developing states.”)  See generally Stathis N. Kalyvas, 
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corresponding with the third wave of democratization.
51  After 1994, the number of new 
ethnic conflicts has apparently declined, along with the intensity of existing conflicts.
52 In 
a recent overview, Gurr found that both ethnic and political violence have significantly 
declined in all regions of the world since 1990.
53 
Similarly, looking solely at the phenomenon of civil war, James Fearon and David 
Laitin note that the exacerbation of civil wars after the end of the Cold War reflected 
long-term trends rather than a sudden phenomenon caused by ethnic factors.
54  They also 
find that controlling for per capita income, there was no relationship between ethnic or 
religious diversity and civil war.  Indeed, for poor countries, civil war is likelier in more 
homogenous countries.
55  These studies suggest that there may have been a surge in 
violence in the early 1990s, but that the role of ethnicity in producing this surge is not as 
clear as some suggest. 
  These findings alone should give us pause before adopting policies based on 
Chua’s series of anecdotes.  The global sweep of her argument suggests a certain 
universality, but it is important to remember that perceptions of massive and increasing 
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(2003) (“It appears not to be true that a greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity . . . by itself makes a 
country more prone to civil war.” emphasis in original).   26
ethnic conflict are not accurate.  We can not evaluate the net effect of democracy and 
markets without taking the actual levels of conflict into account.  Even if one proceeds 
anecdotally, counter-examples abound. Like the dog that didn’t bark, we do not tend to 
focus on the potential ethnic conflicts that have not occurred. Muslims in Bulgaria have 
lived in peace with their neighbors and received no international attention while Muslims 
in neighboring Bosnia suffered genocide.  Chinese in Mongolia, a much-feared market-
dominant minority who were expelled under communism, have become more tolerated in 
the years since the fall of communism. 
  The condition of Lebanese throughout Latin America provides an interesting 
example.  Chua spends much time describing rising ethnic consciousness among 
indigenous populations in Latin America, and notes that old-line white wealth co-exists 
with newer immigrant groups that have succeeded phenomenally.
56  She mentions the 
Lebanese minority, whose market success has been accompanied by political influence, 
as Argentina, Guatemala, and Ecuador have all had presidents of Lebanese descent.
57  
Nowhere does Chua cite, nor am I aware of, an incidence of mass violence perpetrated 
against Lebanese in the entire region.  Lebanese in these nations have continued to exert 
significant political influence, despite frequent political transition, instability and regime 
change, including periods of both democratization and authoritarianism, and waves of 
neo-liberal reform. 
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  Another “dog that didn’t bark” is South Africa.  This is an important case for 
Chua to explain, for it seems to offer ideal conditions for one of her backlashes.  South 
Africa under apartheid was a paradigm case of a market-dominant white minority that 
held onto power by brutally suppressing democracy.  In the early 1990s, South Africa 
introduced democracy while following the lead of international financial institutions that 
promoted neoliberal reforms.  But the backlashes have not occurred, despite 
overwhelming pressures caused by rising social demands.  There have been no large-
scale expropriations. Furthermore there has been no backlash against democracy, perhaps 
because democracy has not actually threatened white wealth in substantial ways.
58  
Moreover, there has been no widescale violence against the white minority.  Chua’s 
evidence of a portent of future expropriation consists of a single rally of 5000 people in 
2001.
59  It is only by conflating ethnic tension (a relatively common phenomenon) with 
ethnic violence (a relatively rare one) that Chua can consider South Africa anything but 
counterevidence to her thesis. To be sure, South Africa has plenty of problems and 
continuing massive inequalities that must be addressed.
60  But at some level it also offers 
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hope to us all that racial and economic justice, still far from realized there, can be 
achieved through peaceful means.
61   
In addition to dogs that didn’t bark, there are dogs that barked for other reasons.  
Much of the violence in the 1990s was not particularly ethnic in character.  The Zapatista 
rebellion in Chiapas has been primarily about jobs and land rather than ethnic or cultural 
identity, and its leader, Subcommandante Marcos, is from Northern Mexico.
62  Indeed, 
very few of Latin America’s violent civil wars have had any ethnic component.
63  Some 
of the ethnic wars of the post-Soviet republics have involved ethnicity as populations 
reshuffled around new borders, but others have involved no ethnic component 
whatsoever.
64 Other “ethnic conflicts” are actually about other issues only tangentially 
related to ethnicity: the Ibo-Hausa conflicts in Nigeria, for example, may reflect broader 
Muslim-Christian tensions. 
The ongoing wars in the shadow of disintegrating states in West Africa have some 
ethnic component, but many of the relevant military divisions are armies and militias 
organized on national, not strictly ethnic, lines.
65  Many of these conflicts are about 
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property rights in commodities and the struggle over valuable resources like diamonds.
66 
According to one author, “The extent of primary commodity exports is the largest single 
influence on the risk of conflict.”
67  Might some of these conflicts have an ethnic 
dimension? Certainly.  But to characterize the current wars there as ethnic struggles 
would be to miss the most important parts of the story, such as the collapse of states and 
the economic competition that fuels the conflicts.
68  Interestingly, globalization of 
markets may fuel these conflicts in the sense that lowered transaction costs increase the 
value of diamonds and other resources.  This is not Chua’s argument, however.  Her 
argument—that market-dominant minorities will be targeted by demagogues after 
political liberalization—hardly begins to account for the violence in Sierra Leone, which 
has not been directed against the Lebanese minority.  West Africa is clearly a stretch for 
her causal claims. 
  In short, it is not clear that the 1990s have, in aggregate, witnessed more ethnic 
conflict and violence than other periods.  The best evidence seems to be that the early 
1990s did see such an expansion, which declined gradually during the end of the decade.  
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The perception of an ethnic cauldron has been exacerbated by a few high profile 
genocides and the tendency of observers to characterize many conflicts as “ethnic” when 
they may in fact have other causes.
69  The fact of declining conflict should lead to caution 
about adopting policies for tomorrow based on yesterday’s dynamics. 
 
    2. What Caused the Conflicts that Occurred? 
  Even if conflict was not as common as many perceived, Chua might counter with 
the weak version of her hypothesis: she is not arguing that ethnic conflict is inevitable, 
only that it will be exacerbated by the twin exports of economic reform and democracy in 
countries.  To evaluate this claim requires attention to two linked questions: do 
democratic reforms and freer markets lead to greater ethnic violence, and if so, how 
much?  If the relationship is positive but small, we need hardly rethink a major portion of 
our foreign policy, given that democracy may bring positive benefits to countries without 
market-dominant minorities. The answers to these questions require understanding the 
causes of ethnic violence. This is the subject of a massive body of literature, which could 
not even be summarized here; but it is safe to say that the question is a controversial 
one.
70   
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    a. Relative Status and Ethnic Violence 
Broadly speaking, there are two streams of writing on ethnic nationalism.
71  One 
school, sometimes called the primordialist, stresses long-standing cultural differences 
between groups and sees these as relatively fixed.
72  The other, which is sometimes 
labeled “instrumentalist” sees ethnicity as socially constructed in response to changing 
conditions and the manipulation of symbols by ethnic leaders.
73  Many scholars of this 
school, identified frequently as “modernists,” see cultural difference as being magnified 
by economic and social change associated with modernization.
74  Ethnic groups come 
into conflict when they compete over resources, and modernization can exacerbate this 
competition for at least two reasons.  First, the rise of the modern state, with its control 
over resources, creates a new locus for conflict as groups try to capture the state.  Second, 
expanded economic opportunities provide possibilities for upward social mobility, 
sometimes leading to new barriers to groups and rising inequality.
75   
This modernist position foreshadows Chua.  Just as the rise of the state and 
economic growth lead to conflict, so democratization and economic liberalization 
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exacerbate it.  What both arguments share is a commitment to the relative gaps between 
groups as the primary cause of ethnic conflict.   
Ted Gurr, for example, has argued that relative deprivation is a primary cause of 
ethnic violence.
76 Gurr found the “extent of a communal group’s collective disadvantage 
vis-à-vis other groups is a principle source of its members grievances and perceptions 
they have a common interest in collective action.”
77  Gurr surveyed 233 communal 
groups from 1945-1989 and found a strong correlation between “relative ecological and 
demographic stress” and ethnic grievances.
78  It would seem to follow that economic 
disparities of the type discussed by Chua would contribute to ethnic tension, and possibly 
even ethnic violence. 
  Political scientists and sociologists who study ethnic conflict do not all agree on 
this position.  Some have argued that relative economic deprivation alone cannot explain 
ethnic conflict, since relative deprivation is a universal characteristic of economies.
79   
Walker Connor has pointed out that the fact of economic disparity is so widespread, that 
it appears to be involved in every case of ethnic conflict. Disproportionate economic 
performance may result from other features, such as the fact that ethnic groups tend to 
populate different regions that have different resource endowments.  Differential 
economic performance in such circumstances would not result from ethnic factors, but 
                                                 
76 TED GURR & BARBARA HART, ETHNIC  CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS (1994); GURR, supra note 50; see 
also TED ROBERT GURR, WHY MEN REBEL 13 (1969) (“Discontent arising form the perception of relative 
deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence.”) 
77 GURR, supra note 50, at 123. 
78 Id.  
79 WALKER CONNOR, ETHNONATIONALISM: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING (1993).   33
would appear concurrently.
80 Again, the distinction between apparent correlation and 
causation is important. 
Others have tried to square the “primordialist” difference-based position with the 
relative deprivation theory.  Alexis Herclides notes that the more a group possesses a 
common history or can be characterized as a nation, “the more secondary the role played 
by the factor of inequality or disadvantage in spurring active separatism.”
81  Others have 
also focused on explicitly political understandings as the primary determinant, rather than 
economic deprivation.
82  Gurr himself notes that “the profile of contemporary 
ethnonationalist movements displays a general lack of congruence between a group’s 
status in society and its demand for separation.”
83  Thus, the degree to which economic 
imbalances cause ethnic conflict is not certain, but does not suggest the uniform, 
unidirectional causal relationship implied in Chua’s simple story.  
Some suggestive evidence on the role of economic differences can be found in the 
experiences of developed countries, though Chua repeatedly asserts that patterns of ethnic 
relations in the developing world bear no resemblance to those in developed countries.  
During the 1950s and 1960s Flanders and Slovakia were given large resource transfers to 
narrow the gaps between them and other regions.
84  These regions developed rapidly, but 
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this narrowing of the income gap was accompanied by rising demands for autonomy.  
Similarly, the Basque and Catalan regions of Spain have advanced their ethnic separatist 
claims while they are becoming even richer relative to the rest of Spain.
85  In short, 
developed country experiences suggest that relative deprivation may not be a key factor 
at all. 
 
    b. Democracy, Development and Ethnic Violence 
If the relationship between economic deprivation and ethnic conflict is not clear, 
the literature on the relationship between democracy and ethnic conflict suggests more 
consensus.  A long line of research suggests that political violence, in general, is not 
associated with either autocracy or democracy, but occurs most often and severely in 
semi-democracies.
86 This is the so-called inverted U-shape relationship, with high levels 
of violence in the middle and low levels on either tail.  This research implies that 
democratization from autocracy can lead to greater conflict in the short run, consistent 
with Chua’s thesis.   Indeed, one of Gurr’s studies found that in some circumstances 
democratization had exacerbated ethnic conflict between 1975-86.
87  On the other hand, 
greater democratization from a semi-democratic point should lead to less political 
violence.   
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  Mousseau recently conducted a large-n study testing the relationship between 
higher levels of democracy and development on the one hand and political conflict on the 
other.
88  Mousseau confirms that “nations at middle levels of democracy and 
development are more likely to experience higher levels of political violence than nations 
at low and high levels of democracy and development.”
89  He notes, however, that ethnic 
heterogeneity has no independent effect: it is not associated with higher levels of violence 
within nations except under certain political conditions.
90  Thus, Mousseau rejects the 
“primordialist” thesis that ethnic division is sufficient to cause violence.   
Mousseau further notes that ethnic heterogeneity does make a difference with 
regard to the effect of high levels of democracy and development in reducing violence.  
Democratization has a greater pacifying impact in homogenous nations than in 
heterogeneous ones.  Indeed, for highly heterogeneous semi-democracies, he finds that 
autocracy does better than democracy in reducing the chance of political violence.
91 
These findings seems intuitive and broadly consistent with Chua’s “modernist” thesis, at 
least for countries starting from low base levels of democracy and development.  
Autocracies have greater means to repress ethnic violence than democracies.  Shifting to 
semi-democracy deprives leaders of many tools, and can lead to a surge in conflict.   
Even if the probability of violence indeed increases with democracy and 
development, the magnitude of the effect must be analyzed.  We must also be concerned 
with the levels of violence, not merely the direction of the causal relationships.  
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Mousseau notes that highly democratic heterogeneous nations have a probability of 
extreme violence of 14%, more than double the rate of highly democratic homogenous 
nations.  What we do not know is whether this absolute magnitude is severe or not.  
Semi-democracies, which have the highest rate of violence, have between a 20 and 25% 
probability of extreme violence. The policy question then becomes whether these levels 
are of sufficient magnitude to discourage democratization for heterogeneous nations that 
are autocratic. 
  If the relationships among democracy, development and ethnic violence are 
complex and non-monotonic, what factors enhance the probability of conflict? As Chua 
suggests, a key element is the desire of group leaders and political entrepreneurs to 
exploit the situation. Ethnic tension is generally a top-down phenomenon, not one that 
emerges from the grassroots.
92  Leaders are an independent variable.  Leaders may 
engage in what scholars identify as “ethnic outbidding;” such a problem exists where two 
or more leaders compete for support within an ethnic group, within a democratic 
framework, each seeking to prove it is more “ethnic” than the other.  However, 
outbidding is really an “exceptional, not typical, consequence of democratization.”
93   
Democracy is not the only source of demagoguery.   As Chua acknowledges, 
Stalin killed many Jews and others in a transformation that can hardly be called 
democratic.  The Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, it has been argued, targeted certain 
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minorities in the midst of its general auto-genocide.
94  Idi Amin targeted Asians in 
Uganda, ultimately expelling them.  None of these regimes was a democracy.  The fall of 
Suharto in Indonesia is alleged to have exacerbated anti-Chinese feeling, as evidenced by 
the massacres of 1998 in Jakarta, but we should not forget the millions killed in 1965, 
when Suharto rose to power.  Suharto’s coup was hardly a democratizing moment.   
In sum, the most generous interpretation of the social science literature suggests 
that in heterogeneous societies, a transition to democracy and markets may contribute to 
greater ethnic conflict, especially if they are transitioning from autocracy. The strength of 
the effect is unclear.  The U-shaped finding suggests that it may be limited to the short 
term, if the country continues to democratize and develop. To be certain Chua recognizes 
the distinction between short and long term. She notes that “markets and democracy may 
well offer the best long-run economic and political hope for developing and post-
Communist societies.  In the short run, however, they are part of the problem.”
95  But if 
ethnic violence on the whole is on the decline, the short run may be over. 
 
    c. An Alternative Hypothesis: Political Transition 
Another possible interpretation of the surge in conflict in the early 1990s followed 
by a decline is that political change, in general, offers windows of opportunity for 
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action.
96  Political transition creates uncertainty, and this is true whether the transition is 
towards or away from a democratic direction. Uncertainty is a major source of potential 
ethnic conflict.
97   When old social contracts are broken, power shifts and tension results, 
allowing political entrepreneurs to exploit anxiety about a change in group relations.
98  In 
short, it may be the fact of political transition and change, rather than the direction of that 
change, that is the most significant factor.   
The political transition hypothesis I am articulating is consistent with the 1990s 
pattern of an early surge in violence followed by a decline in conflict.  Gurr notes that the 
decline in ethnic conflict resulted in part because the breakup of states had largely passed.  
The closing of the Cold War led to the emergence of many new states, the political 
borders of which hardly corresponded to ethnic boundaries.  The result was great 
opportunities for ethnic demagoguery.
99   
A focus on political transition per se also helps us understand why instances of 
ethnically-oriented violence also occurred in the period before the widespread export of 
democracy and markets.  Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda or Stalin’s in the Soviet Union are 
two of many examples.    Demagogues exploit political opportunities in periods of rapid 
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change.  The opportunities for demagoguery may lie less in the character of democracy 




Chua’s primary purpose is to call attention to an important phenomenon in an 
interesting way, and in this she succeeds.  The normative section of the book is very 
brief, which is perhaps appropriate given the difficulty of “solving” the problem she lays 
out, and the potential perverse effects that might result from such efforts.
100  This section 
considers Chua’s recommendations as well as other possible solutions she does not 
suggest.  Her recommendations fall into three categories: those directed at the market-
dominant minorities, those directed at leaders in the developing world, and those directed 
at the international community. 
The recommendations directed at minorities are unobjectionable. Chua calls on 
them to engage in more philanthropy, especially that directed at the broader society, 
rather than the narrow needs of the ethnic group.  If this were an efficacious solution, one 
wonders why many market-dominant minorities have not independently pursued such an 
option.  One possibility is that, in contexts where private philanthropy is not well-
developed, members of the targeted market-dominant minority might fear that public 
philanthropy could serve as a public signal of their wealth, and hence heighten awareness 
of their market-dominance.   
                                                 
100 See Davis et al., supra note 8, at 353-55.   40
For leaders in the developing world, the obvious implication is to promote 
redistributive policies (progressive taxation and promotion of a welfare state), such as 
those that have worked in places like Malaysia as well as in Western societies.  Indeed, 
Chua is correct that the simultaneous transition to democracy and markets is unlike the 
manner in which these institutions developed in the West, and needs to be carefully 
managed. 
The larger normative questions are directed to the international community.  If the 
causal relationships among democracy, development and ethnic violence were as strong 
Chua’s title suggests, the obvious normative implication would be to stop the 
simultaneous export of democracy and markets.  Chua is clear that she is not calling for 
an end to democratization or economic liberalization, but limits her major normative 
recommendation to “understanding.”  Nevertheless, if she were right, the development 
community should consider whether reforms ought to be sequenced, with democracy 
preceding markets (or vice versa). 
I have suggested in this review that Chua is not right, or at least has not 
established her claims sufficiently to adjust policy.  The causal relationships involved are 
complex, and the effect of democracy on violence is not so strong as to produce clear 
normative conclusions.  We cannot be sure that the net global result of democracy and 
markets is indeed worse.  It may be that if we were to adopt a different set of global 
policies (promoting single party states and closed economies) conflict over resources 
would be worse, not better.  We are unable to draw either conclusion based on Chua’s 
anecdotal data.   41
If Chua is right, and ethnic harmony, democracy and markets cannot all co-exist, 
how might we choose among the right course to take?  Mousseau’s inverted U-shaped 
finding, namely that violence is associated with mid-levels of democracy and 
development, provides a framework to answer the question.  Assuming, arguendo, that 
ethnic conflict is the supreme evil that we seek to minimize, we can do so in one of two 
ways:  either by returning to dictatorship and poverty or by increasing democracy and 
development.  There seems no moral reason to prefer the former solution. 
Chua’s actual normative suggestions to the international community are minimal.  
She makes a brief suggestion that minority rights and constitutionalism ought to be given 
greater weight.  If Chua is suggesting that the various actors involved in promoting 
democracy abroad have been promoting a merely proceduralist, electoral model without 
constitutionalism, she is simply wrong.
101  Indeed, a major component of the recent wave 
of law and development is precisely the kinds of institutions that can protect rights, 
promote justice and develop constitutionalism.  For most of the 1990s, “democracy 
programs” explicitly adopted a substantive component or else were closely linked with 
rule of law programs that sought to ameliorate the dangers of too much democracy.  
Whether or not these efforts have been effective is a different story, of course.
102  One 
can question the competence and good faith of the rule-of-law-promoters, one can and 
ought to critically examine the effectiveness of these programs, but one cannot seriously 
question that these are “programs actually being implemented.” 
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More surprisingly, Chua devotes no attention to specific institutional designs that 
might ameliorate ethnic tension.  Political institutions provide a framework within which 
elites can manage conflict or promote it, depending on their inclination.  Constitutional 
design and political institutions are thus important variables that can exacerbate or 
ameliorate ethnic tension.
103  For example, Saideman and his co-authors found that 
although democracies are more likely to experience ethnic conflict, institutions matter.
104  
Proportional representation systems, by allowing a range of views to be expressed, have 
much less ethnic protest and ethnic conflict than presidential systems, which have a 
winner-take-all character.
105 Federalism can increase ethnic protest, depending on the 
lines drawn, but can also reduce the level of ethnic violence, perhaps because it allows 
for local autonomy for particular groups.
106  A good example is the experience of Nigeria 
after a 1967 redrawing of federal boundaries into multiethnic states, following the 
Biafran war.
107  Of course, no institutional design is perfect and there is no way to 
eliminate ethnic conflict entirely, but choices can make a difference.
108 
Chua also does not consider steps that the international community can take to 
minimize the risks of backlashes.  One important finding on the decline of ethnic 
violence in the second half of the 1990s is that the capacities of both democratic 
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governments and the international community in combating ethnic violence have actually 
increased.
109  For the international community, the embarrassments of Rwanda, which 
took place while the West stood idly by, have led the international community so seek to 
use mechanisms that will help nip ethnic conflict in the bud.
110  Each incident of ethnic 
conflict is not isolated.   
One other strategy for the international community is to target systems of finance 
and supply that feed ethnic conflict.  In many instances, ethnic conflict is exacerbated by 
the presence of external markets for natural resources like diamonds.  In addition, 
diaspora communities in rich countries can provide financing that perpetuates conflict.
111  
Stemming the flow of funds to ethnic demagogues can reduce the incentives to engage in 
ethnic violence. 
Another example of effective international intervention is the role of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in preventing ethnic 
violence in Eastern Europe. The OSCE, an organization of virtually all Europe’s 
governments, set up the High Commissioner on National Minorities in 1992 in reaction to 
the ethnic conflict in the Balkans and charged the office with serving as an "instrument of 
conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage.”
112  The Commissioner has taken a 
proactive role in going to potential hot spots and negotiating instruments at the highest 
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political levels to ensure minority protections.  Even though these instruments are not 
legally binding in a formal sense, Ratner suggests they have been extraordinarily 
effective in securing minority protections and preventing conflict.  In helping make 
norms effective, the High Commissioner has sometimes mobilized international support 
for the solutions he has offered, for example by pressuring members of the ethnic 
minority in a neighboring state to support the agreement.
113  In other instances, he has 
mobilized international funding to make complying with commitments easier. The point 
is that there are quite specific institutional approaches to ameliorating ethnic conflict that 
would benefit from normative analysis.  But this would draw attention away from the 
image of the world as an ethnic cauldron. 
  Perhaps the greatest normative impact Chua’s book can have is to call attention 
to the general importance of distribution in development programs.  The early 1990s 
enthusiasm for radical free-market reforms assumed that putting wealth into private 
hands would alone provide the basis for growth.  This assumption ignored all questions 
of distribution, with the result that market democracy is perceived as illegitimate in 
much of the world. The backlash from maldistribution that Chua highlights can occur 
regardless of ethnic divisions, and promoters of free markets would do well to 
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  Chua’s book is a stimulating tour of the last decade’s ethnic conflicts that will 
appeal to many. As a book of academic politics, she satisfies many constituencies.  Free-
market ideologueswill likely seize on the book to argue that economic liberalization 
requires authoritarian rule, and argue against democracy.
114  Progressives may focus on 
the need for democratization and redistribution, without economic liberalization.  Critical 
race scholars will focus on the apparent ubiquity of racial and ethnic conflict. 
  But the wide appeal of Chua’s argument does not entail that she is correct.  When 
one looks at the trees rather than the forest, many of the phenomena tied together by her 
theory do not in fact belong there.  Most prominently, there has been a decline in global 
ethnic conflict since the mid-1990s.  Even for those conflicts that have occurred, the 
relationship among democracy, development and conflict is not as straightforward as she 
suggests. Policymakers must understand ethnic dynamics, but should also not let the need 
for “understanding” lead them to disengage from democracy around the globe.  
Chua’s work fits squarely in two growing trends.  First, it is part of a recent shift 
in those writing on globalization, both within and outside the economics profession.
115  
These writers are beginning to question the particular forms of globalization launched by 
international financial institutions.  This is a leftward shift in the classical sense: whereas 
optimists see democracy, development and law working in mutually supportive ways, the 
recent stream of writings resonate with the classical Marxist view that conflict is endemic 
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to social change.
116  Such critical views are of crucial importance given the obvious 
failures of globalization to legitimate itself in the eyes of the world. 
The second trend is that of the strong turn toward social science in legal 
scholarship.  Lawyers are increasingly drawing on social science tools to inform 
normative arguments about the design of legal institutions and to conduct positive 
research.
117  Chua’s study poses a social science question but fails to use the appropriate 
techniques of social science to answer it.  Chua does not offer any magic normative 
solutions, which is perhaps admirable, but also is slippery with evidence, which is highly 
problematic.  The book lacks the methodological rigor which must ultimately support any 
compelling conclusion about the complex relationships between democracy, development 
and ethnicity.   
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